Are listed Indian firms finance constrained: Evidence for 1991-92 to 1997-98 by Bagchi, A. K. et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Are listed Indian firms finance
constrained: Evidence for 1991-92 to
1997-98
A. K. Bagchi and Pranab Kumar Das and B. Moitra
Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta
23. February 2002
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41611/
MPRA Paper No. 41611, posted 28. September 2012 20:13 UTC
Economic and Political Weekly February 23, 2002 727
Are Listed Indian Firms
Finance Constrained?
Evidence for 1991-92 to 1997-98
We formulate a simultaneous equations model and with the data of a panel of 600 Indian
firms for the period 1991-92 to 1997-98 test the hypothesis of finance constraint. The firms are
classified by the dividend pay-out ratio into high-cost and low-cost groups; a high dividend
pay-out ratio implies a low cost of information faced by the firms and vice versa. In the
context of developed countries, earlier researchers found that the firms in the high-cost group
shows evidence of finance constraints and severity of the constraint goes down with the
decrease in the cost of information. In our study we found that the firms with medium dividend
pay-out ratios are constrained in the loans market so far as investment in fixed capital is
concerned. This is quite a surprising result that requires careful explanation.
I
Investment Behaviour with
Imperfections in Capital
Market
There was no theory of aggregateinvestment in a market economybefore the emergence of the macro-
economic theory in the 1930s. In classical
political economy it was assumed that
investors invested what they wanted to
save. But there was an idea that capitalists
would cease to save and invest if the
profitability of investment sank below a
‘normal’ level. So it would be possible to
build up a theory of investment by making
it a function of the rate of profit. Another
idea, that relates investment to a rise in
sales had been advanced by J M Clark. The
question of finding the determinants of
investment moved to centre stage with the
General Theory of J M Keynes (1936) and
the parallel work of Michal Kalecki, who
had arrived independently at many of the
ideas that went into the making of the
Keynesian revolution.
However, the central quest of Keynes
and Kalecki was for variables that could
be seen as powerful influences on aggre-
gate investment than for variables that
determined investment at the firm level.
Keynes solved the problem of constructing
the micro-foundations of aggregate invest-
ment by treating that aggregate as the sum
of investments of representative firms
operating under rules of pure competition.
As a first approximation, as every begin-
ning student of economics knows, he took
investment as a monotonic function of
income and the going market rate of in-
terest (the signs of the two partial deriva-
tives of investment with respect to the two
independent variables would, of course,
be opposite of each other). Kalecki, more
realistically, endowed the firms with a
degree of monopoly power, but basically
still treated them as representative units,
whose investment levels could be aggre-
gated to arrive at the value of investment
for the economy as a whole.
Kalecki was aware that the financial
structure of a firm could have an influence
on its investment behaviour. In Kalecki
(1937), he admitted the proposition that
controllers of firms might not want to
resort to the stock market or to banks for
financing beyond a point, not because the
investment could be unprofitable (after
taking account of interest cost) but because
they might fear losing control. The pos-
sible diversity of firm behaviour in the
presence of such financial constraints,
however, was not formally modelled for
long after the seminal work of Keynes (and
to a much lesser extent Kalecki) had become
the commonsense of macro-economics.
Keynes (1939) and Tinbergen (1939)
engaged in a famous controversy over the
statistical testing of theories of business
cycles, of which theories of investment
behaviour formed a critical ingredient. This
controversy centred on the question as to
whether elementary regression or correla-
tion analysis could be applied to ‘non-
homogeneous’ and non-stationary eco-
nomic data. Keynes also criticised Tinber-
gen for using statistical analysis without
a proper specification of the models used.
However, neither in the Keynes-Tinbergen
debate nor in the later, much quoted work
of Meyer and Kuh (1957) did credit con-
straint figure as an influence on investment
behaviour of firms.
The senior author of this paper tackled
the issue of private investment of Indian
joint stock companies in the decade of
1950s [Bagchi 1963, Chapter VIII]. That
study suffered from several limitations.
The data that could be easily assembled
were those of firms grouped into indus-
tries, and not panel data of an assembly
of individual firms. Secondly, in a situa-
tion in which government regulations acted
as a constraint on the behaviour of some
firms (but not others) in some years, it was
difficult if not impossible, to isolate the
influence of a finance constraint. Thirdly,
statistical methods for handling essential
non-linearities were simply not yet avail-
able. A finding of the study – not very
strong – that changes in sales, rather than
profit, were the proximate determinant of
investment by joint stock firms during
those years might have indicated that at
least before the serious onset of foreign
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exchange shortage from 1958, most firms
were demand constrained rather than
constrained by finance, especially since
the government essentially implemented a
cheap money policy for private investment
during those years.
There is now a large literature on the
behaviour of firms in an imperfect capital
market. If the capital market is imperfect
then the costs of external and internal
finance differ, violating the Modigliani-
Miller theorem [Modigliani and Miller
1958] regarding the irrelevance of the
financial structure of a firm. In an imper-
fect capital market, unlike in the neo-clas-
sical theory of investment, neither the
interest rate (as in Hall and Jorgenson
1967) nor Tobin’s Q (as in Lucas 1967)1
is the determinant of investment. Tobin’s
Q is defined as the ratio of the shadow
price of the firm to the current replacement
cost of the capital of the firm. If the capital
market is perfect, a typical firm’s invest-
ment decision is governed by the expected
profitability of the investment project. The
firm invests up to the point where the
expected profit from the project balances
the cost of investment at the margin or
when their ratio, which is essentially the
marginal Q, equals unity. The change in
investment due to change in marginal Q
is the investment function of the firm. But
in reality it is difficult to measure Tobin’s
Q unambiguously. Hence what one em-
ploys is the average Q, defined as the ratio
of the stock market valuation of the firm
to its replacement cost. The essential idea
is that the expected profitability of the firm
is reflected in its stock market valuation
and the cost of investment is the replace-
ment cost of existing capital. The marginal
and the average Q coincide under very
restrictive conditions. The assumption of
perfect capital market underlying invest-
ment functions derived from Tobin’s Q
implies that the cost of external financing
does not differ from that of internal financ-
ing. Hence investment is independent of
modes of financing, say between equity or
bank loan. That is to say we are back in
the world of Modigliani-Miller.
Imperfections in the capital market arise,
among other things, because of asymmet-
ric information, leading to moral hazard
and adverse selection between the lenders
and the borrowers. Hence the costs of
financing differ: internal funds cost less
than external funds. Thus investment is
also dependent upon the informational costs
faced by the firm and hence availability
of external finance in the capital market.
In that case, firm investment is constrained
by the availability of loans.
In an imperfect capital market, a firm’s
net worth is an important determinant of
its creditworthiness because it represents
the stake of the owners of the firm. The
outside investors have little control over
the funds they invest in a project, while
the insiders, i e, owners of the firms, can
very well divert the funds to other uses,
so that the project turns bad. However the
project may become unprofitable owing to
an adverse state of nature. This contin-
gency is indistinguishable to the outside
investors from the fund diversion or bad
management case. It is generally assumed
that the larger the net worth of a firm, the
higher is the insiders’ (the owners’ and
managers’) stake in it, and hence the less
they are prone either to mismanage the
project or cheat on its profitability. Hence
in the presence of asymmetric costs of
information, the net worth of the firm in
relation to its borrowing is often used as
a basis for judging its creditworthiness.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in net worth
would prompt lenders to lend more, and
any credit constraint on investment will be
thereby loosened. Since the net worth of
a firm or its change is not generally free
from noise or bubbles in the observable
data most of the empirical studies use the
firm’s cash flow as a proxy for the change
in the net worth.
Models of investment that incorporate
asymmetric information were formulated
by Jaffee and Russell (1976), Myers and
Majluf (1984), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
Williamson (1987)2 among others. A major
piece of empirical work in the field of
imperfect capital market and firm invest-
ment is Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988). Later work includes Froot,
Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Gertner,
Scharfstein and Stein (1994), King and
Lavine (1993). Hubbard (1997) is a good
survey paper in this area; Chirinko (1993)
is good survey of neoclassical theories of
investment.
In some early writings, viz, Bagchi
(1962), Krishnamurty (1964), Krishna-
murty and Sastry (1971)3 studied the prob-
lems of investment of Indian firms, but
they had not dealt with the problems of
investment in an imperfect capital market.
In a recent study Ganesh-Kumar, Sen and
Vaidya (2001) studied the investment
behaviour of Indian firms in an imperfect
capital market. They found that the firms
with more outward orientation, measured
by the export intensity of their sales, are
less constrained in the financial markets
and vice versa. We are not aware of any
other study in the Indian context.
The paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the methodology, Sec-
tion III describes the data and variables,
Section IV reports the empirical results.
The overall conclusions are presented in
Section V.
II
Investment Behaviour of
Firms in India: Methodology
In India, prior to 1991, the financing
decisions of firms were regulated since the
amount of equity issue was subject to the
approval of the Controller of Capital Is-
sues. The banks and the financial institu-
tions were also subject to various regula-
tions in respect of lending. So prior to 1991
it was not possible to test how far the firms
were on their desired path of financing or
not. Hence we concentrate on the post
liberalisation era in India, viz, since 1991-92.
There are two principal approaches in
the empirical literature for tackling the
problem of firm investment in an imper-
fect capital market, viz, reduced form
regression, using Tobin’s Q and structural
model estimation and using the Euler
equation. In the former approach, a re-
duced form regression equation is esti-
mated using Tobin’s Q and cash flow as
the regressors. In a situation where the
finance is not a binding constraint, Tobin’s
Q is likely to explain the investment
equation and the null hypothesis that the
coefficient of cash flow is zero should be
accepted. In the other case, the null hypo-
thesis that the coefficient of cash flow is
zero is rejected. In the structural model
estimation, the investment equation is
derived from the dynamic programming
problem of firm investment incorporating
the constraint on the availability of credit.
The investment decision of a typical
firm is defined as the solution to the dynamic
optimisation problem:4
α sMax Et Σ βi [Π (Kis , θis)
Iis s = t
– C (Iis , Kis , λis) – psIis
subject to the capital accumulation con-
straint
Kit = (1-δ) Kit–1 + Iit,
where βi = subjective discount factor,
Π(·) = Profit function, θit= exogenous shock
to the profit function, C(·) = adjustment


]


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cost function, ps= tax adjusted relative
price of capital goods, λit= exogenous shock
to C, δ = depreciation rate.
The first order condition gives
pt + CI(·) = qit
 
∞ s
where qit = Et{Σ βi (1–δ)[ΠK (Kis , θis)
s = t
– CK (Iis , Kis , λis)]}
The right hand side of the last equation
is just the marginal Q. Specifying a linear
homogeneous C function yields an invest-
ment specification
(I/K)it= ai + b [qit–pt] + λit + ∈it
where b is a parameter of the C function
and ∈it is an optimisation error.
Under certain assumptions (perfect
competition in product and factor markets,
homogeneity of fixed capital, linear homo-
geneity of production and adjustment cost
functions, independence of financing and
investment decisions) average Q can be
used as a proxy for marginal Q so that the
estimable equation becomes.5
(I/K)it= ai + b Qit + λit + ∈it (1)
where Qit is the tax adjusted value of
Tobin’s Q.
This form of the investment function
holds when there is no friction in the capital
market. In the presence of friction, we can
estimate the following equation
(I/K)it= ai + b Qit + c (CF/K)it
+ ∈it (assuming λit zero) (2)
where cash flow (CF) serves as a proxy
for change in net worth. While testing for
credit constraints, firms are sorted a priori
into groups of those likely to be ‘con-
strained’ and those likely to be ‘uncon-
strained’ on the basis of some measure of
capital market imperfection. Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen (1988) sorted the
firms by dividend pay-out ratio. They can
also be sorted by year of incorporation (or
age of the firm), size of the firm, existence
or absence of association with reputed
industrial group, or values of interest to
interest plus cash flow, etc.
In the reduced form approach, if H0: c=0
is rejected in equation (2) then we can infer
that there is no capital market imperfection
affecting the investment decision of the
firm.6 Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988) and earlier researchers adopted this
approach. However, the value of cash flow
has some serious shortcomings as a mea-
sure of finance constraints. For example,
a change in cash flow may result from a
demand shift or a change in investment
opportunities rather than from the change
in productivity of investment. In such a
situation a strong correlation between cash
flow and investment may not result from
capital market imperfection. The main-
tained assumption in the literature is that
the change in cash flow is due to change
in expected future profitability. If this is
caused by, say a demand shift, it should
be captured by some measure of invest-
ment opportunities, like Tobin’s Q. Again
it has also some shortcomings as a regres-
sor in empirical applications. Firstly, the
appropriate measure should be the mar-
ginal Q, which is not observable. In all
empirical applications, researchers use the
average Q that is observable. These two
are assumed to coincide in equilibrium or
assumed to move in the same direction.
The structural form estimation seeks to
tackle some of these problems.
In the structural estimation approach,
the same value maximisation problem is
set up together with an explicit constraint
on the availability of outside finance.
Theoretically two sets of Bellman equa-
tions7 are derived, depending upon whether
the finance constraint binds or not. As
discussed earlier, the firms are classified
a priori into groups of those that are likely
to be constrained and those that are likely
to be unconstrained using some measure
of financial imperfection. Accordingly two
sets of regression equations are estimated
using these two groups of firms.8 But this
approach also has its limitations, particu-
larly because the derivation of the esti-
mable equation becomes very difficult. In
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Some Important Variables (Groupwise)
 M1 M2 All
Var Mean Median SD Skew Mean Median SD Skew Mean Median SD Skew
I 42 0.19 21.69 11.61 9.14 0.47 60.09 18.67 6.78 0.37 45.23 22.64
FK 31.33 10.78 72.56 6.42 51.50 10.78 174.74 9.19 41.41 10.77 134.15 10.81
WK 4.10 1.40 10.99 5.52 6.49 1.75 18.83 8.50 5.30 1.56 15.46 8.78
∆WK 0.89 0.09 15.57 1.92 1.49 0.06 24.76 6.51 1.19 0.08 20.68 6.01
CF 69.52 31.83 111.06 3.87 118.80 38.10 284.92 6.49 916 34.72 217.60 7.79
MV 49.84 11.98 204.13 19.78 87.28 12.51 301.33 6.84 68.56 12.19 258.0 10.42
Q 4.30 0.91 36.71 20.89 3.09 0.90 18.72 19.85 3.69 0.90 29.14 23.53
∆Q 1.59 -0.09 34.88 20.23 1.13 -0.10 18.48 20.56 1.36 -0.09 27.91 22.72
D/E 3.97 0.76 20.22 12.33 8.51 0.74 132.22 34.81 6.24 0.75 94.60 47.62
AGE 28.95 23.00 21.29 1.36 29.32 24.00 20.50 1.49 29.13 23.00 20.94 1.42
RTD 81.03 90.46 22.52 -1.56 81.79 90.09 21.71 -1.68 81.41 90.32 22.12 -1.62
DPIY 0.08 0.16 0.57 13.87 0.35 0.32 1.01 14.84 0.33 0.2445 0.70 9.97
Notes: I= Investment, FK= Fixed capital, WK= Working capital, DWK= Investment inworking capital, CF= Cash flow, MV= Market value of the firm, Q= Average
Q, DQ = Change in Q, Age= Age of the firm, RTD = Relative trading days of the equity, DPIY= Dividend pay-out ratio in 1991-92.
All the variables are calculated at constant prices.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Some Important Variables Deflated by Fixed Capital (Groupwise)
M1  M2 All
Var Mean Median SD Skew Mean Median SD Skew Mean Median SD Skew
I/FK 0.241 0.028 4.22 41.95 0.217 0.057 0.94 22.09 0.229 0.043 3.06 55.46
WK/FK 0.273 0.12 41.68 3.05 0.43 0.155 1.69 13.02 0.351 0.142 29.49 4.29
∆WK/FK -0.63 -0.086 44.48 -29.7 0.116 0.006 2.18 24.73 -0.26 0.007 31.48 -41.8
CF/FK 6.02 2.49 29.63 22.37 5.95 3.14 15.2 15.56 5.98 2.85 23.56 24.34
MV/FK 5.52 1.08 41.65 18.21 4.54 1.26 21.5 15.91 5.03 1.17 33.15 20.25
Notes: I= Investment, FK= Fixed capital, WK= Working capital, ∆WK=Investment in working capital, CF= Cash flow, MV= Market value of the firm. All the variables
are calculated at constant prices.
Economic and Political Weekly February 23, 2002730
fact non-linearity of some of the functions
and the presence of more than one con-
straint makes the derivation of the closed
form solution almost impossible.
We have adopted the reduced form
approach but with some amendments of
the investment equation (2) as proposed
by Fazzari and Petersen (1993). They
emphasise the importance of the supply of
working capital for running a firm.9 If the
firm faces a binding finance constraint or
if the internal and external costs of finance
vary because of the presence of informa-
tional costs, the supply and cost of working
capital is affected. This in turn affects the
profitability and the investment behaviour
of the firm.
Investment in working capital10 is more
liquid and less costly to adjust compared
to investment in fixed capital. For the latter,
its cost of reversal is much higher. Thus
when firms face a constraint in the credit
market, firm investment in working capital
competes with fixed investment for the
limited pool of finance available. It fol-
lows that if a firm is finance-constrained,
as its investment in fixed capital rises that
in working capital falls, ceteris paribus.
Thus when the change in working capital
is included in the investment equation, it
has a negative coefficient for financially
constrained firms. On the other hand, a
positive coefficient of investment in
working capital in the fixed investment
regression implies a change in the invest-
ment opportunities arising out of, say, a
positive demand shift or a loosening of the
finance constraint. Hence a change in
working capital is a better regressor than
cash flow to measure the impact of credit
rationing. The marginal valuation of
working capital of a firm falls with a rise
in the level of working capital stock while
the marginal valuation of investment in
fixed capital rises as finance constraint
tightens. As this happens, firms will be
more willing to substitute more of working
capital for fixed investment. Hence one
would expect investment in working capi-
tal to bear a positive relation with the stock
of working capital.
Working capital is defined as current
assets (accounts receivables, inventories,
and cash) less current liabilities (accounts
payable and short-term debt). However, it
may be noted that working capital is
correlated with sales and cash flow. These
problems can be avoided if one considers
two sets of regressions. The first is a set
of regressions of investment on Q, cash
flow, changes in working capital, etc. The
second is a set of regressions of change
in working capital on cash flow, Q and the
stock of working capital. Thus we have
a system of simultaneous equations
which could be estimated employing
2-SLS or 3-SLS.
III
Data and Variables
For empirical analysis we use the firm
level panel data compiled by the Centre
for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE)
and distributed through its software
‘ProwesS’. The CMIE provides firm level
data for several variables from the annual
audited financial results of the respective
firms and the data on share price and related
variables from the Bombay Stock Exchange
(BSE) (or any other stock exchange in
India, if that firm is not listed in BSE) daily
transaction statements. From the database
of ProwesS we have taken the firms listed
in any stock exchange in India, incorpo-
rated prior to 1991 and the accounting year
is (or at least for our period of coverage)
April to March.11 Given these criteria we
found 600 firms in the database for which
seven years of data are available, viz, 1991-
92 to 1997-98. However, there are several
variables in a form of annual changes.
Hence for actual estimation, total number
of years covered is six. Thus we have a
panel of 600 firms with six years of ob-
servations, 1992-93 to 1997-98. These 600
firms belong to 40 broad industry groups.
The industry groupings are based on the
criteria of sales: if for a firm 50 per cent
or more of sales come from a particular
product then the firm is classified into that
industry group and if a firm does not satisfy
this criterion for any product, then it is
classified into the category of diversified
firms.
For empirical study, we need data on the
following variables or some variables
computed from them, viz, investment,
capital stock at replacement cost, working
capital stock, change in working capital,
inventory, cash flow, tax adjusted value
of Tobin's Q, dividends, etc. Many of these
variables are required to be taken at con-
Table 4: Some Important Rates of Return (Groupwise)
 M1  M2 All
Var Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
R_MV1 20.17 8.22 246.83 8.94 9.21 50.91 14.55 8.70 178.27
R_MV 33.23 7.14 453.27 90.54 8.04 2356.2 61.89 7.61 1696.6
R_FK1 18.23 10.03 110.77 19.88 11.16 45.09 19.05 10.65 84.56
R_FK 14.84 8.95 102.76 16.03 9.87 31.09 15.43 9.38 75.90
R_IK1 5.72 6.89 319 8.98 7.49 20.99 7.35 13.07 28.39
R_IK 4.91 6.16 51.56 7.08 6.81 21.35 5.99 6.52 39.49
Notes: R_MV1= Rate of profit on last period’s equity;  R_MV= Rate of profit on current period’s equity;
R_FK1= Rate of profit on last period’s fixed capital; R_FK= Rate of profit on current period’s fixed
capital. R_IK1= Rate of profit on last period’s invested capital R_IK= Rate of profit on current
period’s invested capital.
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics for Some Important Borrowing Ratios (Groupwise)
M1 M2 All
Var (Per cent) Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
TB 44.34 42.65 39.85 39.97 42.10 41.14
TBB 41.28 37.72 42.47 39.33 41.87 38.49
TBBS 35.16 31.74 36.82 33.06 35.99 32.43
TBF 31.99 30.44 25.56 21.77 28.78 25.79
ES 68.10 63.12 33.12 68.22 50.62 66.06
KM 21.31 0.22 28.31 2.30 24.81 1.03
SB 56.28 45.71 13.53 46.41 34.92 46.11
SBB 72.53 48.49 34.49 51.84 53.53 50.06
SBBS 58.51 36.12 28.79 41.28 43.17 38.55
SBF -2.99 22.66 4.27 16.50 0.64 19.71
R 17.07 15.76 16.57 15.61 16.82 15.70
RL 21.77 13.04 21.98 13.02 21.87 13.04
Notes: TB= Total borrowing as per cent of total liability; TBB= Total bank borrowing as per cent of total
borrowing; TBBS =Total short-term bank borrowing as per cent of total borrowing; TBF= Total
financial institute borrowing as per cent of total borrowing; ES= External source of funding as per
cent total funds; KM= Capital market source as per cent of external funding; SB= Borrowing as per
cent of external funding; SBB= Bank funding as per cent of total borrowing source; SBBS= Short-
term bank funding as per cent of total borrowing source; SBF= Financial institute funding to total
borrowing source; R= Interest expenditure as per cent of total borrowing; RL= Long-term interest
expenditure as per cent of total non-bank borrowing.
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Table 5: Panel Data Estimation of
Investment Function: the Case of Single
Equation (Coefficient: Q)
 Estimated Coefficients of  R2
 CF  Q
Group: M1 0.026 -0.0002 0.181
(5.19) (-0.06)
Group: M2 0.031 0.00003 0.266
(13.24) (0.02)
Notes: (1) All the level variables are deflated by
capital stock.
(2) The figures in the parentheses are the
respective t-ratios.
Table 6: Panel Data Estimation of
Investment Function: The Case of Single
Equation (Coefficient: ∆Q)
 Estimated Coefficients of  R2
 CF  ∆Q
Group: M1 0.02 -0.018 0.200
(3.95) (-5.94)
Group: M2 0.031 -0.0004 0.266
(13.19) (-0.32)
Notes: (1) All the level variables are deflated by
capital stock.
(2) The figures in the parentheses are the
respective t-ratios.
stant prices. This was achieved by deflat-
ing the current price values with appropri-
ate price indices. The value of capital stock
at constant price is taken to be the value
of plant and machinery deflated by the
price index of gross domestic fixed capital
formation. Instead of gross (or net) fixed
capital formation, we consider only change
in the value of plant and machinery be-
cause of the fact that the former also
includes land. Following precedence, we
also define cash flow as income plus
amortisation plus depreciation that is
deflated by the wholesale price index for
the industry group to which it belongs.
Working capital is defined as current assets
less current liabilities. The former com-
prises accounts receivables, inventories and
cash while the latter comprises accounts
payable and short-term debt (debts of less
than one year maturity). Working capital
is deflated by the price index for stocks
(of inventories).
Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the
market value of the firm to its replacement
cost. The market value is defined as the
sum of market value of equity plus market
value of long-term debt. The market value
of equity is the price of shares multiplied
by the number of shares outstanding. To
get a representative annual average price
of equity we take the simple average of
daily prices. As there is no significant
secondary market for long-term debt of the
firms, the book value of such debts is taken
as their market value. The replacement
cost of capital is difficult to calculate –
there is arbitrariness in the selection of
depreciation rate, valuation of old capital
at current prices, etc. Moreover, the com-
panies periodically revalue their capital.
Hence, we treat the value in the company
accounts as replacement cost of capital.12
To make the numerator and denominator
comparable we have to either deduct the
stock of inventories from the numerator
or add it to the denominator. We tried both
in our empirical analysis. There is no
difference in result. To arrive at the tax
adjusted value of Tobin’s Q we take the
tax net of the Q ratio where the tax rate
in each year for each company is calculated
on the basis of its actual tax payment made
in the current year. The tax rate is calcu-
lated as the proportion of profit before
tax, if there is a payment of tax; otherwise
it is set at zero. The market value of the
firm is deflated by the GDP deflator
while capital at replacement cost is de-
flated by price index for gross domestic
fixed capital formation. Thus the tax
adjusted value of Tobin’s Q and the tax
rate are given by:
Ps Ns + TL – INV PkQ = (1–t)
K P
PBT – PAT
and t =
PBT
where Ps = annual average of equity price,
Ns = number of equities outstanding, TL=
long-term loans, INV= stock of invento-
ries, K = capital stock at replacement cost,
Pk = price index of gross domestic fixed
capital formation, P = GDP deflator,
PBT = profit before tax, PAT = profit
after tax.
As discussed earlier the degree of credit
constraint depends upon the extent of the
informational problems that the firms face
in the loans market. Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen (1988), as mentioned above, used
the dividend pay-out ratios in some initial
years to classify firms facing different
degrees of informational incompleteness.
The dividend pay-out ratio is defined as
the ratio of dividend payment to profit after
tax. The data for the initial years are not
used for estimation purposes and are called
off sample year data. The logic of using
dividend pay-out ratio to classify firms
into more (or less) costly information
groups is borrowed from the public
economics literature [Auerbach 1979,
Bradford 1981, King 1977] in which divi-
dends are treated as residuals in firm
decisions. Let us consider a firm for which
the cost of external finance is higher than
that of internal finance and the adjustment
cost of capital is higher than the cost of
adjusting payouts. Then paying high divi-
dends for such firms is not consistent with
value maximisation in the presence of
profitable investment opportunities. Hence
the firms that retain a larger proportion of
their current profit than others belong to
the group of firms facing a high cost of
external finance and, hence, are likely to
face finance constraint. However, the
underlying assumption in this approach is
that the firms are free from any take over
bids in the period under consideration.
Otherwise a low dividend may lead to a
take over of the firm.
However, the grouping of firms by divi-
dend pay-out ratios may be inappropriate
if the cost of adjusting pay-out is lower
than the cost of adjusting capital stock.
Even if the cost of pay-out is higher, it may
not work if the firms deliberately adopt a
policy of paying large dividends so as to
give a wrong signal to the outside investors.
Hence, one should also look for other cri-
teria for classifying firms. Other such possi-
ble criteria are the value of capital stock,
age of the firm, growth of sales, credit
rating in the initial years, market capital-
isation, underwriting cost, association with
some industrial group or bank, concentra-
tion of ownership, or the frequency of
trading of its equity in the stock market.
Instead of classifying the firms on the
basis of off sample years one can also
employ the classification criteria in the
sample years or take the average of the
criteria in the sample years and then use
them to classify the firms.13 We employed
the dividend pay-out ratio of the initial
year (i e, 1991-92)14 to classify the firms
into two different groups, viz, the firms
to the left of the median dividend pay-out
ratio and to the right of the median divi-
dend pay-out ratio (M1 and M2 respec-
tively, for short). M1 comprises of the firm
with dividend pay-out ratio [0 per cent 24
per cent] and M2 with dividend pay-out
ratio (24 per cent 100 per cent].15 Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen (1988) classified
the firms into two groups, viz, zero divi-
dend paying and positive dividend paying
firms. The zero dividend paying group in
our case is by and large the first quartile.16
We also grouped firms on the basis of
below average and above average divi-
dend pay-out ratio, but the corresponding
regression results are found to be extremely
poor implying a meaningless classification.
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We also classified firms on the basis of
percentiles other than the median as will
become evident as we proceed.
IV
Empirical Results
The empirical results are divided into
two subsections – results on the basis of
descriptive statistics and those based on
the econometric results.
Descriptive Statistics
In Tables 1 through 4 we give descrip-
tive statistics for some of the variables of
importance while in Tables 5 through 9 we
give the regression results. All the vari-
ables except the ratios are taken at constant
prices. We denote those firms with lower
dividend pay-out ratios as M1 and those
with the higher ratios as M2. Table 1 shows
that the mean investment is lower for M1
than for M2 while Q as well as its change,
∆Q, is higher in M1 than in M2. The
median investment is also lower in M1
than in M2 but the median value for Q is
the same for both the groups and for ∆Q
they are very close. The corresponding
standard deviation is higher for M1. These
suggest that there are some firms in M1
for which Q and ∆Q values are very large
relative to those for M2 firms. This factor
raises the Q and ∆Q values for M1 firms.
Though the mean value of fixed capital is
higher for M2 than for M1, the correspond-
ing median values coincide. This means
that there are some relatively large firms
in M2 whose presence raises the mean
value of fixed capital stock of M2. This
inference is also confirmed by a lower
standard deviation of capital for M1 than
for M2. The data indicate that there are
important diversities within M1 and M2.
The mean cash flow is lower for M1 than
M2 while the medians are very close but
the standard deviation is higher for M2.
This also suggests that the presence of
some very large firms is raising the mean
cash flow in M2, and is influencing the
market values of the firms. Both the mean
debt-equity ratio and the corresponding
standard deviations are higher for M2 than
M1 while the median values for both the
groups are pretty close. This also suggests
that there are some firms in M2 with very
high debt-equity ratios for which the mean
is higher for M2. However there is no
marked difference in respect of the mean
age of the firms and the relative trading
days of the two groups.
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics
for some of the variables deflated by the
capital stock, the deflation is expected to
nullify the size effect.17 In some cases the
relative position of the descriptive statis-
tics for the deflated variables for the two
groups are the reverse of those of the non-
deflated values. This observation applies
to cash flow, market value of the firms and
less strongly, for investment. As explained
earlier there are some firms in M2 with
relatively large values for investment,
capital stock, market value, cash flow, etc,
and, hence, the mean values of M2 in those
cases are higher though the medians are
very close. As a result of deflating, the size
effect gets reduced so that they are re-
versed in some cases. In the case of in-
vestment, the deflated values for the mean
are very close across groups. In the case
of change in working capital, the mean is
still lower in M1; it actually becomes
negative in M1 while that in M2 it is still
positive.
Table 3 gives some of the borrowing
ratios, for stocks as well as flows. The
variation is not significant for the stock
ratios across groups. Total borrowing as
a percentage of total liability is around 40
per cent for both the groups – 43.4 per cent
for M1 and 39.85 per cent for M2. The
medians are also very close to the respec-
tive means implying both an intra- and an
inter-group similarity in this ratio. How-
ever, the proportion of borrowing from
financial institutions is around 10 per cent
more for M1 than M2. Among the ratios
for the flow variables, that for external
source of borrowing is more than double
in the case of M1 compared with M2. That
is to say, M2 firms finance a larger share
of investment with retained earnings. But
one would expect it to be the other way
round when firms are classified by the
dividend pay-out ratio. The distribution of
external source of borrowing as judged by
median values is more symmetric for M1
than for M2 firms and the standard devia-
tion is three times higher for M1 firms.
Thus one can infer that there are a few
firms with very low levels of external source
of funding in M2 so that the average is
lowered. Of the total external funding, the
capital market as the source is slightly less
important in M1, but bank funding is very
important for M1. Bank funding for short-
term loans is used mainly for working
capital purposes and it accounts for 58.51
per cent in case of M1 as against 28.79
per cent for M2. Banks as the source of
total finance as well as for short-term
requirement are more prominent in the
case of M1. The financial institutions as
the source of new loans is not important
for both the groups, it is in fact negative
for M1 implying that more of the financial
Table 7: Regression Results : Simultaneous Equations Model (Coefficient: Q)
Dependent  Estimated Coefficients of
Variable CF Q WK ∆WKf R2
Group: M1 ∆WK 0.452 -0.369 0.735 0.716
(14.56) (-16.81) (46.23)
I 0.025 0.0021 0.003 0.182
(5.01) (0.50) (0.92)
Group: M2 ∆WK 0.145 0.0002 0.461 0.776
(38.0) (0.14) (16.66)
I 0.062 0.0004 -0.165 0.272
(6.86) (0,03) (-3.52)
Notes: (1) All the level variables are deflated by capital stock.
(2) The figures in the parentheses are the respective t-ratios.
Table 8: Regression Results : Simultaneous Equations Model (Coefficient: ∆Q)
Dependent  Estimated Coefficients of
Variable CF ∆Q WK ∆WKf R2
Group: M1 ∆WK 0.279 -0.047 0.702 0.766
(9.58) (-25.73) (48.78)
I 0.019 -0.021 -0.004 0.201
(3.9) (-5.15) (-1.12)
Group: M2 ∆WK 0.145 0.59 0.461 0.776
(37.98) (0.37) (16.66)
I 0.062 -0.0003 -0.165 0.272
(6.85) (-0.26) (-3.52)
Notes: (1) All the level variables are deflated by capital stock.
(2) The figures in the parentheses are the respective t-ratios.
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institutions' loans are repaid than is bor-
rowed. This is not very surprising, as very
often the funding from the financial insti-
tutions such as LIC, GIC, IDBI, ICICI
takes the form of equity rather than loans.
The mean as well as median interest cost
as a percentage of aggregate loans are very
close across groups though the standard
deviation is higher in case of M1. How-
ever, the distributions for the groups are
quite symmetric. The distribution of inter-
est expenditure as the percentage of non-
bank loans that is more long term in nature
is more asymmetric for the groups (though
the nature of the asymmetry is similar
across groups).
In Table 4 we have calculated rates of
return on selected values such as equity,
fixed capital and invested capital and these
variables have also been differentiated
according to dates. Though we have re-
ported rates of return on current as well
as lagged values of equity, fixed capital
and working capital, the lagged rates are
conceptually more appropriate. Also the
standard deviation for the current rates of
return is generally higher and therefore
they are more volatile. Hence we concen-
trate on the lagged rates of return. We have
found no particular pattern for the rates of
return across groups.
Regression Results
The regression results are given in
Tables 5 through 9. We test whether c, the
coefficient of cash flow in the equation in
(1) is different from zero. If H0: c=0 is
rejected, it implies a correlation between
investment and cash flow, which in turn
implies the presence of credit constraint.
The results are reported in Table 5. We
employed here the method of panel data
estimation [Baltagi 1995]. As per the stan-
dard econometric practice we reported only
the within firm estimates. Moreover, we
found the fixed effects model to be the
appropriate one for all the groups as per
the results of the Hausman test.18
From Table 5 we find that the coefficient
of cash flow is positive and significant for
both the groups and the sensitivities of
investment to cash flow are pretty close
across groups. On the other hand, Q has
no effect on the investment of a firm
belonging to any group. The overall per-
formance of the regression equation, as
measured by R2, is better for M2 than for
M1. We also estimated the investment
equation with change in Q (∆Q) and report
the results in Table 6. The results are similar
to those in Table 5 except that ∆Q is now
significant for M1 with a negative sign.
This implies that investment is negatively
related with the rate of change in Q.
As stated earlier, the significance of cash
flow is not a conclusive proof of credit
constraint. Cash flow and investment would
be positively correlated if investment
opportunity increases. In the existing lit-
erature the standard position is that a change
in investment opportunities is reflected in
the Q values. But in our case, as reported
in Table 5, the coefficient of Q is insig-
nificant.
This needs further exploration. We have
already argued in the spirit of Fazzari and
Petersen (1993) that in a situation of bind-
ing credit constraint, firms substitute in-
vestment in fixed capital by investment in
working capital. Thus we also include
investment in working capital, i e, change
in working capital, in the investment
equation (3). However, investment in
working capital is itself a decision variable
for the firm. Hence we set up a simulta-
neous equations model. Investment in
working capital equation (4), depends on
Q, cash flow and the stock of working
capital.
Iit CFit
= a1 + b Qit + cKi,t–1   Ki,t–1
∆WKit+ d + Uit (3)Ki,t–1
∆WKit CFit
= a2 + µ Qit  + θKi,t–1  Ki,t–1
 
WKit+ γ + Vit (4)
  
Ki,t–1
where Iit = investment, Kit = capital stock(plant and machinery in our definition),
CFit = cash flow, Qit = tax adjusted value
of Q, WKit = working capital, ∆WKit =
change in working capital, ai = firm
specific factor for investment equation,
θi = firm specific factor for change in work-
ing capital equation, Uit = disturbance term
for investment equation, Vit = disturbance
term for change in working capital equa-
tion, i and t are the indices for firm and
year respectively. In order to take care of
heteroscedasticity each variable in the
regression equations other than those that
are ratios is divided by Ki,t-1.
Given their nature, the equations can be
estimated by 2-SLS. First we estimate
equation (4) and use it to get the forecast
values of change in working capital, ∆WKitf
which is then used to estimate equation (3).
The identification problem fortunately does
not raise its head here. The estimation
results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. Here
also we only reported the within firm
estimator. As before, the Hausman test
shows that the model is that of fixed effects
type for all the groups.
The results, as reported in Tables 7 and 8,
show that cash flow is still an important
explanatory variable for fixed investment.
But unlike in the single equation case, now
the value of its coefficient is strikingly
different between the two groups, viz, 0.025
for M1 and 0.062 for M2. Q is still insig-
nificant in the fixed investment equation
for both the groups, though the coefficient
of ∆Q in the fixed investment equation is
negative and significant. The coefficients
of the explanatory variables in the invest-
ment in working capital equation (4) are
of expected signs. The striking result is the
value of the coefficient of ∆WKf in fixed
investment equation (∆WKf is the forecast
value of ∆WK obtained from the estimated
equation of (3)). It is insignificant for M1
and negative and significant for M2. In
other words this result suggests that the
firms in M2 with a high dividend pay-out
ratio face problems in the loans market.
The firms of this group cannot borrow in
the loans market as they like and/or the cost
of internal finance is lower than that of the
external finance. Hence these firms resort
to working capital funds for investing in
Table 9: Properties of ∆WKf in the Fixed Investment Equation
Cut Off Dividend Pay Out Interval (Per Cent) Coeff of ∆WKf in Investment Equation
Percentile Lower Upper Lower Upper
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
20 ≤ = 0 (0  1000%] +ve significant non-significant
25 [0 3.51] (3.51  1000] +ve significant non-significant
30 [0 12.39] (12.39  1000]  non-significant -ve significant
40 [0 19.56] (19.56  1000]  non-significant -ve significant
50 [0 245] (245  1000]  non-significant -ve significant
60 [0 30.52] (30.52  1000]  non-significant -ve significant
70 [0 36.51] (36.51  1000]  non-significant non-significant
80 [0 448] (448  1000]  non-significant non-significant
90 [0 55.59] (55.59  1000] non-significant non-significant
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fixed capital. Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen (1988) and Fazzari and Petersen
(1993) obtained the expected result, viz,
finance constraints are more stringent for
low-dividend paying firms compared to
the high-dividend paying firms, but our
result indicates a contrary phenomenon.
This apparently striking result needs to
be carefully examined. The classification
of the firms into lower and upper pay-out
groups on the basis of the median, as we
indicated earlier, is rather arbitrary. In order
to minimise the degree of arbitrariness, we
further classified the firms into low-divi-
dend paying and high dividend paying
groups on the basis of the other percentiles
of dividend pay-out ratio in 1991-92. We
divided the firms into two groups by taking
20 percentile and the rest, 25 percentile
and the rest, and so on up to 90 percentile
and the rest. Thus in the case of 20 per-
centile cut-off ratio, all the firms with
dividend pay-out ratios higher than those
obtaining for the 20 percentile groups
form the upper dividend pay-out group. A
similar observation applies to the classes
obtained by using 25 percentiles, etc.
These percentiles and the corresponding
dividend pay-out intervals are given in
Table 9. We estimated the simultaneous
equations model for the low and high pay-
out groups for all the percentiles. The
results are by and large the same as before
except for the coefficient of investment in
working capital in equation (4). As the
fourth column of Table 9 shows, the
coefficient of ∆WKf is positive and sig-
nificant for low pay-out group when the
cut-off is at 20 percentile and 25 percen-
tile, i e, up to pay-out ratio of 12.39 per
cent. For the rest, the coefficient of ∆WKf
is non-significant. For the high paying
group (last column of Table 9), the coef-
ficient of ∆WKf is negative and significant
up to the cut-off of 40 percentile, i e, up
to when the upper pay out interval is 30.52
per cent and higher. Thereafter it becomes
non-significant when the upper pay-out
interval is 36.51 per cent and higher. Thus
we see that when the upper pay-out inter-
val is in between [12.39 per cent 1,000 per
cent] and [30.52 per cent 1,000 per cent],
the firms in this group are finance con-
strained, while firms in the lower pay-out
group for any pay-out interval are uncon-
strained. To check whether the result is
biased by differences in weightage of
particular industries in the groups classi-
fied by dividend pay-out ratios, we com-
puted the industrywise distribution of firms
in the high and low pay-out groups. No
significant differences in industry
weightage between the different dividend
pay-out groups were observed. We also
checked for the relative importance of top
50 business houses in the two groups. It is
also found to be uniform across groups: 81
in M1 and 83 in M2.
As we have already observed, Table 9
also reveals that the financial constraint
binds for the group of firms in the 30th
to 70th percentile range. We subjected
these firms to some closer inspection. In
particular, we divided these firms by the
ratio of their investment to previous year's
capital stock for each year. For each year
there were three categories: firms belong-
ing to the bottom 10 per cent; firms be-
longing to the top 10 per cent; and the rest.
We eliminated those firms that had invest-
ment to previous year’s capital stock in
either of the first two groups in at least two
years of the study period. The idea was to
concentrate on those firms whose ratios of
investment to previous year’s capital stock
were in general outside the tails of the
distribution. For these firms, the value of
γ was -1.36 (significant). This result sup-
ports our conjecture that the finance con-
straint is strongest for firms within this
group. We found no evidence that mem-
bership of firms in the set of top 50 business
groups plays any significant role.
A tentative interpretation of our results
is as follows. The firms in the low divi-
dend-paying group by definition retain most
of their profits and can then use them for
making investment, or for ploughing them
into other firms of the business group or
transfer them in other ways. We find in
fact that they invest less than the high
paying group – the average investment is
lower in this group than in the other group.
We also find that they have a lower average
cash flow. In addition to the factors
mentioned above, it is also likely that lower
profitability prospects prompt the firms to
invest at a lower rate. A low dividend pay-
out ratio is not a hurdle to get outside
finance. The debt-equity ratio of these firms,
which is based on the stock variables is
lower so that availability of new external
funding is not very difficult. In fact this
group has higher average external finance
(68.1 per cent) than the other group (33.12
per cent). The proportion of borrowing
in external finance (56.28 per cent for
M1 and 13.53 per cent for M2) and bank
borrowing in total borrowing (72.53 per
cent for M1 and 349 per cent for M2)
are also higher for the low dividend
paying group.
The firms in the very high dividend-
paying group, viz, 36.51 per cent and above
have also no difficulty in getting external
finance. This is consistent with the results
of Fazzari et al. The firms in the medium
dividend-paying group, viz, in the interval
[12.39 per cent to 30.52 per cent] have
difficulty in getting external finance for
investment. These firms have a very high
retention ratio and they finance their in-
vestment mainly through retained earn-
ings because they cannot borrow as much
in the loans market as they want.
To find out the effects of some other
variables on the firm investment we used
some other possible regressors, like age of
the firm, relative trading days, debt-equity
ratio, rate of return (all the rates of return
as in Table 4), etc. The coefficients of these
variables in the investment equations were
found to be insignificant.
V
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to
analyse the effects of imperfections of the
capital market on investment in fixed capital
by Indian firms. Does an imperfect credit
market act as a binding constraint on
investment of the Indian firms? To pursue
our goal we investigated the role of work-
ing capital in a finance constraint regime.
We set up a simultaneous equations model
that incorporate the interactions of invest-
ment in fixed capital with that of working
capital. The firms that face higher cost in
the loans market are more likely to face
finance constraint. Hence firms are clas-
sified into high information cost group and
low information cost group. We employed
the dividend pay-out ratio in the initial year
as the classification criterion as is the
standard practice in the literature. The firms
below the median dividend pay-out ratio
in 1991-92 are classified into high infor-
mation cost group and the firms above the
median dividend pay-out ratio in 1991-92
is classified into low information cost
group. We estimated the single equation
model of investment and also the simul-
taneous equations model for each group.
The main conclusions of this study are
the following. First, cash flow is the most
important determinant of firm investment
for the low dividend as well as the high
dividend paying groups. But the sensiti-
vity of investment to cash flow is higher
for the high dividend paying group. Tobin's
Q has no role in explaining investment,
though the coefficient of changes in Q is
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significant for the low dividend-paying
group. Second, the investment levels in
fixed capital for the low dividend paying
group (i e, high information cost) are not
found to be finance-constrained. The very
high dividend-paying group is also not cons-
trained in the loans market for financing
investment. It is the medium dividend-paying
group who are really finance-constrained
as far as fixed investment is concerned.
This result can arise because of two sets
of reasons that are polar opposite of each
other. A firm may pay high dividends,
because the managers know that they can
raise whatever finance they need by bor-
rowing from banks or by floating deben-
tures or equities. Hence, the firm is not
finance-constrained in its decisions. A firm
may also pay high dividends because it
faces low investment opportunities: it is
not constrained by finance as it has few
profitable projects to finance anyway. In
the case of low dividend pay-outs, the
reason may be again that either the pro-
fitability is low and hence the firm simply
does not intend to squander internal re-
sources by pleasing outside shareholders.
In the opposite case, while the profitability
of new projects is high, the groups in
control wants to use mainly internal re-
sources for financing projects, so that they
can be sure of retaining control. When an
active market for corporate control arises,
of course, the firms with low dividend pay-
out ratios become candidates for hostile
takeover bids. Our experience points to the
need to do further work to pinpoint the
exact position of these two groups of firms
in respect of investment opportunities, the
nature of corporate control and threat of
takeover bids.
Notes
1 For original formulation of Q theory of
investment see Brainard and Tobin (1968) and
Tobin (1969).
2 Jaffee and Russel (1976), and Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) apply the informational problems
in the loans market and Williamson (1987)
also applies it in the loans market with costly
state verification while Myers and Majluf
(1984) applies it to the equity market.
3 A survey of the literature could be found in
Krishnamurty and Sastry (1975) and also in
Desai (1973).
4 See Auerbach (1979) for the dynamic
formulation used here
5 The dependent variable or the regressors that
are in levels in the estimable equation when
divided by K also takes care of heteros-
cedasticity in panel data.
6 See Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995),
Lamont (1997), Calmoris and Hubbard (1990),
Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990).
7 Bellman equation is the first order condition
of maximisation of the dynamic programming
problem.
8 See Whited (1992) who employed this
approach.
9 Earlier discussions on the role of working
capital could be found in Dewing (1941),
Meltzer (1960). Also see Mckinon (1973) and
Shaw (1973) for the role of working capital
in the developing countries in general and
Rakshit (1987), (1989) for the Indian case.
10 In Das (1996) it has been showed that when
firms are constrained by the availability of
fixed capital lonas, it increases the use of
working capital loans compared to that in a
free optimum situation. It follows from the
production function relation.
11 Different firms in India follow different types
of accounting years, such as January to
December, April to March, September to
August, etc. Also some firms switch over from
one type of accounting year to another type.
As a result the reported annual statements are
not always comparable across different firms
or for a particular firm over the years. To get
rid of this problem we chose only those firms
which adopt April to March as their accounting
year.
12 It may however be noted that the revaluation
or adjustment for depreciation is more
dependent on tax considerations.
13 It may be noted that the classification criteria
of the initial year may change in the sample
years and as a result low information cost
firm(s) may find a position in the high
information cost group and vice versa. But
separate classification for each year poses
another problem with panel data, viz, the panel
becomes an unbalanced panel. However this
problem does not arise in our case as the
classification as of 1991-92 does not change
much in the sample years. We calculated the
correlation between 1991-92 rank with that of
the other years both by dividend pay-out ratio
and capital stock and these are found to be
very high: higher than 0.9.
14 It may be noted it is in fact since 1991 that
one may adopt such classification because
prior to 1991 the Controller of Capital Issues
regulated both the dividend payments as well
as the equity dividend. So firms’ dividend
decisions were not a free choice.
15 Ganesh-Kumar et al (2001), classify the firms
in their paper by the proportion of exports in
total sales. For Tobin’s Q they employed the
change in sales as a proxy.
16 The first quartile is the group of firms for
which dividend pay-out ratio belongs to [0 per
cent 3.5 per cent). There is only one firm in
this group with positive dividend pay-out ratio
in 1991-92, viz, 1.24 per cent.
17 An alternative deflator to take care of size
effect is sales. However sales and capital stock
are found to be very closely related and either
one can be used to deflate the variables. This
is true for regression results also.
18 In this test H0: Random Effects Model is tested
against the H1: Fixed Effects Model.
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